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RISC Zero fixes a critical flaw in its Groth16 verifier

Two advisories published on November 11 describe a defect that allowed a valid proof to be linked to a different result. The fix requires affected applications to regenerate the proofs they use.

Nexorena Editorial Team

RISC Zero fixes a critical flaw in its Groth16 verifier

The verifier could accept a different result

RISC Zero published two security advisories about its Groth16 proof system on November 11, 2026. According to the maintainers, someone able to produce a valid proof could get the verifier to accept a different claim from the one the proof was meant to attest to. The team rates the flaw as critical. The advisories describe affected versions and migration measures without giving an assessment of affected applications or reporting observed exploitation.

In this system, a receipt links a proof to a claim about the execution of a program. The claim can identify the program, its public output and its exit code. The maintainers locate the defect in the circuits that generate the proof and bind it to the claim. For an application that makes a decision after verification, a receipt accepted by an older version therefore does not guarantee that the submitted result corresponds to the stated computation.

Proofs must be regenerated after the update

The main fix is in version 3.1.0 of the risc0-zkvm software. The advisories also list fixed versions 4.1.0 of risc0-circuit-recursion and 3.0.6 of risc0-groth16. The team rebuilt circuits and introduced a new verification key. Receipts from older versions are incompatible with the new verifier. The maintainers ask integrators to regenerate proofs their applications rely on and report no software workaround.

For on-chain contracts, the dedicated advisory says Groth16 verifier 3.1.0 was added to routers on supported networks, with an exception for Katana mainnet. Older versions 2.2.0 and 3.0.0 still in the routers are to be stopped after a transition period whose length is not specified. Contracts calling an older verifier directly must change addresses. For contracts using the router, the migration concerns proofs, and the router handles selection of the verifier.

Previously cached aggregation results still need attention

The contracts advisory distinguishes the RiscZeroSetVerifier 0.9.0 aggregation verifier. It caches Merkle roots it accepts, which are hashes representing sets of items. If an invalid root had been stored, the contract could still accept an inclusion proof based on that root without rechecking its validity. Stopping the verifier through the router does not cover all direct calls to that contract.

RISC Zero says it stopped this aggregation verifier on Ethereum, Ethereum Sepolia, Base and Base Sepolia using emergency controls. Applications that call it directly need to stop accepting inclusion proofs based on roots it has already cached. For affected teams, the advisories thus distinguish replacing receipts produced before the fix from addressing results their contracts have already stored.

Written with love byOlivia ParkerMeet this editorial pen name ↗

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